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Executive Summary 
 
From the 1990s governments in many countries with extensive social protection systems have 
sought to realign their labor market policies by shifting their policy focus from “passive” income 
support payments towards more “active” programs. Such “active” measures include a diverse 
range of interventions and programs aimed at improving the functioning of the labor market, 
notably by matching the unemployed and other disadvantaged groups to jobs or, by enhancing 
their employability and skills to improve their employment prospects. 
This paper reviews recent findings on the relative effectiveness of different active labor 
market programs with an emphasis on the extent to which they meet the needs of women and 
young people. It then reviews findings on the role and effectiveness of publicly funded training 
and skills programs. It also considers reforms to the public employment service and related 
delivery organizations with a particular focus on evaluation findings concerning the impact of 
front line case managers and of subcontracting program delivery to external providers. The paper 
aims to facilitate learning from developments in the OECD area and the conclusion considers 
how these findings may be of relevance to Latin American and Caribbean countries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
From the 1990s governments in most member countries of the European Union (EU) and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have sought to realign their 
labor market policies by shifting their policy focus from “passive” income support payments 
towards more “active” programs. Such “active” measures include a diverse range of 
interventions and labor market programs aimed at improving the functioning of the labor market, 
notably by matching the unemployed and other disadvantaged groups to jobs or, by enhancing 
their employability and skills to improve their employment prospects.
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This paper reviews recent findings on the relative effectiveness of different active labor 
market programs (ALMPs) with an emphasis on the extent to which they meet the needs of 
women and young people. It then reviews findings on the role and effectiveness of publicly 
funded training and skills programs. It also considers reforms to the public employment service 
(PES) and related delivery organizations with a particular focus on evaluation findings 
concerning the impact of front line case managers and of subcontracting program delivery to 
external providers. The paper aims to facilitate learning from developments in the OECD area 
and the conclusion considers how these findings may be of relevance to Latin American and 
Caribbean countries. 
The paper does not seek to review the abundance of individual evaluation studies of 
ALMPs and individual country activation reforms. Instead it summarizes findings from recent 
evidence reviews where researchers have undertaken comprehensive searches for and 
assessments of “high quality” studies.  The evaluations included in these evidence reviews have 
typically utilized either experimental or quasi-experimental techniques that enabled valid 
comparisons to be made between the outcomes of those who participated in programs against 
those who did not. The distinctive feature of these more recent comparative evidence reviews is 
that methodological improvements have enabled researchers to utilize meta-analytical techniques 
allowing them to draw firmer policy conclusions about what works and for whom.
2
 
                                                 
1
 “Passive” policies are those concerned with providing replacement income during periods of joblessness. “Active” 
policies concern support for labor market integration which may typically include assistance with job search, 
training, job creation, hiring subsidies and programs to promote small enterprise creation. 
2
 Meta-analysis involves a set of statistically based techniques for combining quantitative findings from different 
studies to synthesize estimates of program effects. It is a powerful instrument for analyzing the impacts of 
comparable policy interventions, while controlling for a range of factors pertaining to these interventions or the 
environment in which they took place (Greenberg et al, 2005). 
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2. Activation and active and passive labor market policies 
 
To understand the recent evolution of OECD labor market programs, it is useful to distinguish 
between particular types of active labor market programs (ALMPs), such as job search 
assistance, skills training or employment subsidies, and wider “activation” strategies that may 
encompass a combination of the different ALMPs within a reformed service delivery system. 
Activation approaches emerged after publication of the 1994 OECD Jobs Strategy and typically 
involve increased job search and mandatory program requirements for the unemployed that 
increase in intensity the longer a person receives a benefit payment (see Box  1). 
The distinction between active and passive policies today may be misleading in that the 
financial value and duration of “passive” benefits and the entitlement rules and regulations 
attached to benefit recipients may, in themselves, encourage or discourage job search and 
engagement in employment programs. One of the key features of recent policy developments has 
been how such “passive” benefit entitlements and rules have been “activated”. Many European 
countries have reduced the value and/or duration of (often generous) unemployment insurance 
benefits, connected benefit entitlement more rigorously to rules on job search and program 
participation, and implemented revised sanctions that seek to engage claimants with employment 
focused services.  
The precise nature of national policies varies but an important variation across the OECD 
is whether individual countries implement a “work first” strategy, that requires unemployed 
people to enter employment as swiftly as possible, or a “human capital development” strategy 
that emphasizes the prior importance of improving the skills of benefit recipients so that they 
may gain access to higher quality employment. The former approach is most closely associated 
with “Welfare-to-Work” (WtW) reforms in English-speaking countries, such as the USA, the UK 
and Australia. The latter approach is associated more with welfare states in western and northern 
Europe, especially with Scandinavian countries (NESC, 2011). 
There are marked variations in investments made by OECD governments in their 
ALMPs, varying from over 1% of GDP in European countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium, 
and Denmark, through to less than 0.5% in countries such as the UK, Slovakia and Greece 
(Eurostat, 2010). Expenditure levels are lower too in countries such as Australia, Canada and the 
USA. Patterns of program expenditure have changed with many countries reducing their 
investment in large scale training and temporary employment programs for the unemployed 
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whilst increasing job search and case manager services. Over the past two years in some 
countries, typically where unemployment has risen fastest, spending on “passive” benefit 
payments has been prioritized (Eurofound, 2010).  
The levels and types of investment in labor market programs reflect political choices and 
other factors but changes in program priorities in OECD countries have been increasingly 
informed by the findings from evaluations and cross-national comparisons. European and OECD 
policy makers and researchers have now accumulated much evidence on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of ALMPs, on activation reforms, and on parallel reforms that seek to “make work 
pay‟”‟ and “make work possible”. This evidence base has underpinned and informed the 
recommendations of both the OECD‟s Jobs Strategy and the EU‟s Employment Strategy through 
which both organizations have encouraged member-countries to review and reform their 
systems.
3
  
Box 1: Activation Measures and Labor Market Programs 
Increased obligations and requirements 
Access to additional employment and job 
search assistance  
1. Individual activity agreements 
* Job search agreements and/or 
integration/insertion contracts 
* Stricter monitoring of job search and 
employability activities 
* Mandatory requirements to participate in job 
search, training, employment or workfare 
programs  
 
2. Stricter conditionality  
* Speedier requirements to accept wider range 
of jobs, working conditions and lower wages 
* Restrictions of grounds on which jobs can be 
left voluntarily 
* Sanctions aimed at stimulating job search 
and promoting self sufficiency 
* More rigorous application of sanctions 
around availability for and actively seeking 
1. Case management services 
* Personalized support and individual 
interviews 
* Access to counseling and health related 
assistance 
* Access to other “make work possible” 
supports, such as child care, help with 
transport costs, etc. 
 
2. Employment assistance and labor market 
programs 
* Job search assistance and guidance 
* Job matching 
* Job-related training 
* Subsidized employment with regular 
employers 
* Wage based temporary employment, “work 
for your benefit‟‟ and workfare programs 
                                                 
3
 For further details on the OECD Jobs Strategy and the European Employment Strategy see, respectively:  
http://www.oecd.org/document/1/0,3746,en_2649_33927_38939649_1_1_1_1,00.html  and 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=101&langId=en  
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work and meeting benefit conditions 
 
 
3. Duration and value of out of work benefits 
* Reduction in value of benefit relative to 
wages 
* Restriction of benefit duration 
* Access to small business start up support and 
grants 
 
3. Financial incentives to make work pay 
* More generous disregard of earnings whilst 
receiving benefits 
* Tax credits or in-work benefits to 
supplement wages in low paid/entry level jobs 
Source: Adapted from Table 1, Eichorst et al, 2008. 
 
3. The Public Employment Service (PES), targeting and eligibility for ALMPs 
 
In OECD countries the PES typically provides a free job matching service for job seekers and 
employers and enhanced services for people who have greater difficulty in making the transition 
into employment. The core job matching services of the PES are usually supplemented by a 
variety of employment programs including job search assistance and counseling; training and 
education; work experience and job creation; and assistance with self-employment and 
geographical mobility. The PES may directly provide these services or act as a „gateway‟ to 
them. 
In many English-speaking countries the PES also is responsible for taking claims and 
paying unemployment and related means-tested benefits. In other OECD countries 
unemployment and other benefits are administered by social insurance agencies, often with the 
involvement of social partners, with minimum income social assistance paid by municipalities. 
In such systems the PES provides labor market assistance and has a role in implementing work 
activity tests and acting as a „gateway‟ to employment related services.  
In some countries the PES continues to provide a “walk-in” service to all job seekers who 
can access information about job vacancies and other services although in many countries such 
general services are increasingly provided for job seekers and employers through other self-
service channels, such as the telephone or internet (see Box 2). In most countries access to more 
expensive publicly-funded employment services and ALMPs is targeted at priority groups. This 
targeting is often connected with the specific cash benefit that people receive and programs may 
be targeted at particular categories of service users who are perceived to face common barriers, 
such as disadvantaged youth, single parents, married women returning to the labor market, 
people with disabilities, and minority ethnic groups.  
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Box 2: Developments in PES service delivery channels 
In an increasing number of OECD countries the PES has used developments in information and 
communication technologies to create three principal service channels: 
 Contact services, where clients have a direct personal contact with PES staff and 
advisers; 
 Call centers, where the client can access information about labor market services and 
cash benefits through a central phone number, often with access to free phone facilities 
from local PES offices; 
 Online internet services, typically involving a single website where job seekers and 
employers can access information about job vacancies, training and employment services. 
This information can be accessed 24 hours a day but many PES offices also have self- 
service kiosks that can be accessed in their offices and in other public places. Some PES 
websites provide access to other relevant websites, including those of private 
employment agencies, and some have developed a service so that job seekers and 
employers can enter and select resumes online. 
Enabling job seekers and employers to use self-service methods enables PES offices to focus 
their staff resources on serving disadvantaged or long term unemployed clients and to give more 
targeted services to high-priority employers.  
 
The eligibility rules for particular services and programs are designed in part to increase cost 
effectiveness by reducing “deadweight”. The aim is to ensure that service users who can get jobs 
through their own efforts or with minimal assistance are not placed in more expensive provision 
that might also delay their entry into employment. Such rules serve to target particular 
individuals or groups to ensure they are placed in appropriate assistance. Eligibility rules also are 
connected with conditionality and sanctions. The relevant eligibility rules for different benefits 
will signal those service users who may be required to register with the PES, and those who can 
be mandated or choose to participate in a program. 
Simple eligibility rules have obvious advantages in terms of their ease of operation and 
equality of treatment but they can be a “blunt instrument” and may be “inefficient in terms of 
achieving a good match between individual client needs and provision of support” (Hasluck, 
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2004: 5). In a number of OECD systems the PES now has more elaborate screening and profiling 
instruments to ensure individualized targeting. In some European countries, Australia and the 
USA the PES or other public agencies use profiling to score and weight the barriers facing 
individual service users and to allocate them to unsupported job search, counseling and/or 
different ALMPs (Rudolph and Konle-Seidl, 2005). Proponents of such profiling systems 
suggest they produce earlier and more efficient matching, with scarce resources more effectively 
targeted at clients who are at risk of long term unemployment. In other systems, as in the UK, 
policy makers suggest that profiling is complex to implement and that measured disadvantages 
may not be an effective predictor of how long individual clients are likely to be unemployed. In 
these systems interventions are mostly calibrated with duration of unemployment with more 
expensive provision targeted at those who have been unemployed for a lengthy period. 
 
4. Evaluating the impacts of ALMPs and “Welfare-to-work” (WtW) 
programs 
 
OECD Governments have experimented with a vast array of ALMPs, ranging from direct public 
sector job creation, work experience programs and employment subsidies, through to stricter job 
search requirements, benefit sanctions, assistance with job search and the costs of taking up 
work. There has also been much experience with training and education programs for the 
unemployed and programs that assist people starting small enterprises. In all OECD countries the 
PES plays a central role in ALMP implementation acting as a “gateway” and referral point for 
unemployed people and employers as well as often being directly involved in program delivery 
and management. 
High-quality evaluation studies of such programs seek to isolate their “net” impacts and 
identify how participation has affected different sub groups. Such impact studies typically track 
the experience of “treatment” and matched “control”‟ groups through surveys or administrative 
data analyzing flows onto and off benefits, transitions into and out of employment, and, mostly 
in US studies, changes in earnings and income.  
These microeconomic studies, which are the focus of this paper, typically use specialized 
statistical techniques to analyze three types of effects.
4
 There are “treatment” effects that arise 
                                                 
4
 Macroeconomic analysts utilize larger datasets using econometric techniques that enable them to also discern the 
aggregate impact of labor market programs, including “deadweight” or “substitution”.  Deadweight refers to the 
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from the beneficial interaction with services and the assistance given. The program has improved 
either/or both “soft” and “hard” skills enabling participants to improve their job search, perform 
their job roles and so become more attractive to employers. There are also “motivation”, “threat” 
or “anticipation” effects, where studies regularly find that a proportion of people stop claiming 
benefits prior to the termination of unemployment benefit payments and/or the compulsion of 
mandatory interviews and participation in labor market programs. Such effects are higher in the 
early stages of benefit claims where they prompt those capable of working to get a job and those 
who may already be working and/or claiming benefits illicitly to cease claiming. 
ALMPs may also induce a “lock-in” effect. This refers to a reduction in job search whilst 
a person spends time on program activities whilst equivalent non-participants may be entering 
employment more swiftly. Such negative effects are typically associated with longer duration 
programs, such as skills training or temporary employment programs, but they may also be 
evident in shorter programs. The key design issue is the extent to which any improvement in the 
subsequent employment and earnings of the program participant exceeds that of a matched non-
participant. 
Until the 1990s the evaluation evidence on program impacts was limited. Initially 
programs were often assessed simply in terms of employment and training places provided and 
budgets spent. In many countries attention gradually shifted to reporting on the qualifications 
gained and/or the immediate employment destinations of participants after leaving a program, 
with some countries reporting on the quality of the jobs and the sectors in which employment 
was gained. In the USA and some other countries the emphasis also shifted to measuring the 
additional “net” impacts of the costs and effectiveness of programs requiring the development of 
more sophisticated evaluation techniques. 
In the 1990s the OECD and European Commission reviewed the findings of the higher-
quality impact evaluations then available (see, for example, Martin, 1998). Although the range of 
available studies was limited, with often varying findings for similar programs, when White 
(2000) reviewed such studies he found that the impacts of the successful programs fell within 
plus or minus five points from a ten percentage gain in employment (White, 2000). The 
emerging consensus from these first descriptive reviews suggested that intensified counseling 
                                                                                                                                                             
people in the target group who would have got jobs even without the program intervention.  Substitution refers to 
the extent to which jobs obtained by a program target group are achieved at the expense of other jobseekers who 
may normally have obtained them. 
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and job-search assistance were most cost-effective in raising re-employment probabilities, 
especially for the long term unemployed. Temporary job creation and training programs were, in 
contrast, more expensive and far less effective, primarily because of their lock-in effects. 
The technical quality and availability of program evaluations was most advanced in the 
USA but has since improved in several European countries. Most of the studies published in the 
1990s and 2000s concern impacts in English-speaking countries and those in northern and 
Western Europe. Many of the studies analyze the impact of activation and ALMPs on recipients 
of unemployment benefits, especially the long term unemployed. There is also, however, another 
group of high-quality evaluations that have analyzed the impact of WtW reforms in the US and 
other countries.  These programs aim to transition beneficiaries from “safety net” passive income 
support payments to employment, often via changes in eligibility rules including, in the US, 
limiting the length of time single parents can remain on passive “welfare”.  These reforms have 
largely been targeted at families receiving minimum-income benefits, principally families 
headed by single parents. There are fewer impact evaluations of more specialist programs 
targeted at people receiving disability benefits, albeit such evaluations would be of less direct 
relevance for developing countries.
5
 
The availability of more higher-quality evaluations using improved data and similar well-
tested econometric methods has enabled recent reviewers to go further analytically when 
combining the results from different studies. These reviewers have utilized meta-analytical 
techniques that allow for the deduction of firmer policy conclusions. 
A comprehensive meta-analysis of European findings was undertaken by Kluve et al (2005) 
for the European Commission, with the analysis developed in subsequent research papers 
(Kluve, 2006; 2010). These studies identified and reviewed findings from over 100 
microeconomic evaluations and classified ALMPs into six core categories.
6
 These comprised: 
 Services and sanctions, which encompassed measures aimed at enhancing job search 
efficiency and matching. This included job search courses, job clubs, vocational 
                                                 
5
 There has been a marked increase in the number of working age people claiming disability benefits in several 
OECD countries and Governments have implemented revised and tighter tests of work capacity alongside 
developing new activation strategies and labor market programs targeted at those affected. For information, these 
policies and relevant evaluations have been reviewed by the OECD (see OECD, 2010c). 
6
 These categories correspond closely to the classifications used by regular OECD and Eurostat surveys through 
which they monitor expenditure patterns of their member states. See 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=LMPEXP and 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Labour_market_policy_interventions  
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guidance, counseling and monitoring, and sanctions in the case of noncompliance with 
job search requirements. 
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 Private sector incentive programs, primarily involving wage subsidies, paid both to 
employers or workers, normally targeted at the long term unemployed and more 
disadvantaged individuals. It also included self-employment grants. 
 Labor market training, encompassing measures like classroom training, on-the-job 
training and work experience. 
 Direct employment programs in the public sector, primarily additional jobs created 
through public works and other socially useful projects generally targeted at the most 
disadvantaged individuals. 
 Youth programs, including training programs, wage subsidies and job search assistance 
targeted at disadvantaged and unemployed young people. 
 Measures for the disabled, including vocational rehabilitation, sheltered work programs 
or wage subsidies targeted at individuals with physical, mental or social disabilities. 
Meta-analytical techniques enabled Kluve to test for the factors that might influence program 
effectiveness and the results were “surprisingly clear-cut” (2006:1). Rather than contextual 
factors such as labor market institutions, the time period or the business cycle, it was “almost 
exclusively program type that matters for program effectiveness” (Kluve, 2006:1). The analysis 
found that the highest positive impacts were produced by “services and sanctions” and subsidies 
with private sector employers. Traditional off-the-job vocational training produced modest 
impacts and public sector employment programs were least effective, with the latter apparently 
detrimental to subsequent employment probabilities.
8
  
Youth Programs.  Kluve assessed youth programs separately. He considered high quality 
evaluations of a diverse range of interventions aimed at tackling youth unemployment, primarily 
from northern Europe. The programs sought either to re-engage young people in education or 
training or place them in unsubsidized employment. Each of the programs was delivered through 
various agencies with most including a central role for the PES in placing young people in the 
various options. Kluve found there was no clear pattern of results with some studies finding that 
                                                 
7
 This corresponds to employment services in Latin America and the Caribbean with the exception that some 
services employ sanctions in the form of reduced unemployment insurance payments if job search is not sufficiently 
pursued. 
8
 The review found too few evaluations of disability programs to draw any conclusions. 
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wage subsidies work for young unemployed individuals, especially those youths from a more 
educationally advantaged background, but other studies did not find such an effect. Youth 
training programs also sometimes displayed positive treatment effects on employment 
probability, but negative results were also reported.  
In a recent paper Bloom (2010) reviewed findings from experimental evaluations of earlier 
US programs targeted at high-school dropouts. Some of the eleven programs relied heavily on 
paid work experience, while others focused more on job training and education. Some programs, 
especially those that offered paid work opportunities, generated significant short term increases 
in employment or earnings, but few of the studies that followed participants for up to two years 
found lasting improvements relative to control group members. The most successful and 
expensive intervention was Job Corps, a combined  employment and training program, mostly 
delivered in a residential setting, targeted at disadvantaged young people aged 16 to 24. The 
evaluation found positive impacts on earnings and employment especially for older youth, that 
only began to fade four years after participation, Bloom concludes that the case for interventions 
aimed at high school dropouts remains overwhelming but without developing a stronger 
evidence base the “paucity of conclusive evidence makes it hard to know how to direct 
resources” (2010: 101) 
De Koning (2007) also reviewed findings from some 130 ALMP evaluation studies. He did 
not utilize meta-analytical techniques but the general conclusions from his descriptive 
comparison of the results broadly mirrored those of Kluve: 
 The evidence on job search monitoring and sanctions points “overwhelmingly” to a 
“positive effect on job entry chances” as does, to a slightly lesser extent, the evidence on 
counseling, placement and wage subsidies for regular jobs (2007: 38).  
 The evidence on training is mixed with the number of studies that point to a positive 
effect being more or less the same as the number of studies showing insignificant or 
significantly negative effects. 
 Most studies of job creation measures show insignificant or negative effects on job 
chances. 
ALMPs and Gender.  The particular impact of ALMPs on outcomes for women was 
considered in another evidence review. Bergemann and van den Berg observed the lack of 
attention given to women‟s experiences in European ALMPs but analyzed findings from those 
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evaluations where data presented distinguished the individual impacts on women. The study 
focused on the experience of women aged over 25 years and most of the evaluations considered 
had been published after 1999. The review gave little detailed information on the size of effects 
(which can be found in the individual studies) but it reported that the results were “remarkably 
uniform” (2006: 14). In general ALMPs had a positive effect on employment probability 
outcomes and transitions for women and the effects were larger than for men, in particular in 
economies with relatively low female labor force participation. These findings were strongest for 
skill training programs whereas job search assistance programs were more effective for men. Job 
search monitoring strongly aﬀected women‟s exit rate out of unemployment and while the size  
of the eﬀect was more or less equal to that for men, the exit destination was “more often non-
participation for women and employment for men” (2006: 15).  
In a more recent meta-analysis Card et al (2009) reviewed 199 program estimates drawn 
from 97 US and European impact studies conducted between 1995 and 2007. This study found 
also that subsidized public sector employment programs were relatively ineffective, whereas job 
search assistance programs generally had favorable impacts, especially in the short run. 
Classroom and on-the-job training programs did not generate especially favorable impacts in the 
short run, but had more positive relative impacts after two years. Comparing across different 
participant groups, the review found that programs targeted at young people were less likely to 
yield positive impacts than untargeted programs, although, in contrast to some earlier US 
reviews, the authors found no large or systematic differences by gender. The study also found 
that evaluations based on the duration of time in registered unemployment were more likely to 
show favorable short-term impacts than those based on direct labor market outcomes 
(employment or earnings).  
All the reviewers comment that a significant limitation of many of the studies considered was 
that few contained information from which a cost-benefit analysis could be derived. They gave 
little information on program costs or detailed data on subsequent earnings, employment or hours 
of work. 
Welfare-to-Work (WtW) Evaluations.  The other body of evidence amenable to meta-
analytical techniques concerns the high quality experimental evaluations of WtW programs 
introduced by different states in the USA from the late 1980s, some of which continued into the 
late 1990s.  
13 
 
The experimental US WtW programs were not targeted at people receiving unemployment 
benefits but mainly at single parent families receiving means-tested cash assistance through Aid 
for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), which in 1996 was reformed into Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).  The findings from these random assignment studies
9
 are 
of particular significance as they influenced the shape of TANF reforms, the employment 
strategies subsequently implemented by individual US states, and the implementation of welfare 
to work approaches elsewhere, such as in the Netherlands, Israel, Australia and the UK.   
David Greenberg, with various colleagues, has utilized meta-analytical techniques to 
synthesize the results from these random assignment studies. These reviews give detailed 
findings of program impacts on earnings, employment and benefit receipt, and on overall costs 
and cost effectiveness (Greenberg et al, 2009; 2005).  
In the first study Greenberg et al (2005) analyzed findings from 27 experimental programs 
targeted at AFDC applicants and recipients. The results indicated that: 
 A typical mandatory program appeared to have a positive effect on participant 
employment, earnings and reduced benefit receipt for five to seven years after random 
assignment, although the impacts started to decline after two or three years. 
 Three program features appeared to be positively related to the effectiveness of 
mandatory programs - increased participation in job search, the use of time limits, and the 
use of sanctions.  
 In-work financial incentives, such as tax credits, decreased the amount of AFDC received 
but did not improve impacts on labor market outcomes. 
 The evidence was mixed over whether increases in participation in basic education, 
vocational education, and work experience increased program effectiveness, with the 
reviewers concluding that overall the findings did not support putting additional 
resources into these activities. 
 Mandatory programs appeared to do better in strong labor markets than in weak ones. 
                                                 
9
 In this type of experimental research, often referred to as the “gold standard” of research designs, individuals who 
meet programs‟ eligibility requirements are randomly assigned by a lottery-like process to either a program group or 
a control group. Individuals in both groups are followed over time, and information is collected on their 
employment, earnings, welfare receipt, and other outcomes of interest. The differences between the groups that 
emerge after random assignment, for example, in earnings or employment, can be attributed to the programs under 
study. 
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This study also reported that the net operating costs of a typical mandatory welfare to work 
program (i.e., the cost to the government of providing program services, excluding income 
transfers, such as AFDC payments) were around $1,800 per program group member (in year 
2000 dollars). Increases in participation in job search appeared to result in very small increases in 
cost, whereas the costs were greater for programs that substantially increased participation in 
basic education and vocational education. Increases in sanction rates engendered higher costs, 
which the reviewers assumed was due to the increased expenditure required for administration 
and enforcement of sanctions. 
In a more recent review Greenberg et al (2009) utilized findings from the 28 WtW programs 
evaluated by the Manpower Development Research Corporation.
10
 The programs were delivered 
in 11 states and two Canadian provinces, and involved over 100,000 research sample members. 
The distinctive contribution of this synthesis was to analyze the “returns on investment”, the 
costs and benefits of different strategies both for individual participants and for government. The 
review emphasized that different types of welfare to work programs had different goals but drew 
the following policy conclusions from the synthesis findings: 
 If a primary goal is to increase participants‟ income, then programs that provide 
individuals with financial incentives or earnings supplements intended to encourage work 
appear to best achieve this goal. While beneficial for participants, earnings supplement 
programs tended to result in a net cost for the government. Participants, however, often 
gained more than a dollar for every dollar the government spent. 
 If a chief goal is to reduce government expenditure, then programs that require 
individuals to look for jobs immediately and that assign other activities if work is not 
found are relevant strategies. These programs tended to be beneficial for the government 
budget (and were less expensive than the type of program described next) but resulted 
either in small benefits or in net costs for participants. 
 If a chief goal is to balance reducing welfare expenditures with increasing participants‟ 
income, then programs that require individuals to participate initially either in an 
education or training activity or in a job search activity can meet this goal. This type of 
                                                 
10
 Many of the US experimental evaluations were undertaken by the Manpower Development Research Corporation 
(MDRC) which, over a long period of time, has produced regular evidence reviews synthesizing evaluation findings 
to better inform policy development and program practice – see http://www.mdrc.org.  
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program, when targeted to both short-term and long-term welfare recipients, was 
beneficial for both participants and the government‟s budget. 
 Mandatory programs that required individuals to participate in General Educational 
Development completion and Adult Basic Education prior to job search did not appear to 
increase the income of participants or save government money. 
 Some mandatory work experience programs - which assign individuals to unpaid jobs, 
often following a period of job search - resulted in limited benefits for participants but 
did provide valuable goods and services for the general public. They did not consistently 
reduce government costs, however.  
The studies reviewed measured only benefits and costs that were reliably expressed in 
dollars. Other benefits and costs, for example, in health or in children‟s school performance or 
well-being, were not estimated and not factored into the cost-benefit analyses. In addition, no 
account was taken of “„displacement” effects where other workers who compete with welfare 
leavers may find it more difficult to obtain or retain employment. 
There have been few random assignment studies in the USA since 1996 but there has been an 
abundance of other studies where researchers from diverse disciplines, using a variety of 
methodological approaches, have sought to evaluate the effects of welfare reform on the 
employment, income, and behavior and well-being of parents and their children.  In one review 
Blank pointed out that, cumulatively, these studies had made these particular changes “among 
the most thoroughly evaluated public policies in history” (Blank, 2007:1). Moffitt (2008), in a 
critical review of this literature, summarized the accumulated findings concerning the impacts of 
welfare reform on caseloads, employment, earnings, family income and poverty in which he 
suggested “confidence” could be placed.  For information these findings are summarized in 
Annex A.   
One tempting conclusion from the European and US meta-analytical findings on ALMPs and 
WtW programs is to infer that policymakers should use only lower cost “services and sanctions”.  
This would be mistaken. A closer reading of many evaluation studies points to more nuanced 
findings. While large scale training and temporary employment programs were often expensive 
and largely ineffective, studies of smaller scale training and employment measures that were 
targeted at particular groups frequently generated more positive results (Meager, 2008; Kluve et 
al, 2005).  
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There is also evidence  that ALMPs are more effective when integrated in a wider activation 
approach where job search support is supplemented by selective referrals to training or other 
longer term programs only for those most likely to benefit from participation. A combination of 
measures, based on evidence of what appeared to work most effectively, is now a feature of 
many activation programs targeted at young people in OECD countries (see Box 3).  
 
Box 3: What works in OECD programs targeted at the young unemployed 
The following features of “best practice” have been highlighted in OECD reviews of 
employment programs targeted at the young unemployed (OECD, 2010a; Quintini and Martin, 
2006): 
 Programs should come into play early - after a period of unemployment of at most six 
months (as in Australia, Belgium, Denmark, New Zealand, Norway, and the UK). Some 
countries, such as Finland and the Netherlands, activate unemployed young people 
immediately.  
 Job search assistance programs are found to be the most cost-effective for youth, with 
wage and employment subsidy programs having a positive short-term impact but a less 
positive net impact on the longer-term employment prospects of participants. 
 In order to connect training programs to local or national labor market needs, private 
sector employers and local communities need to be mobilized and involved in project 
design. 
 Targeting of programs is crucial, distinguishing between teenagers (who should be 
helped to remain in school and acquire qualifications) and young adults (who need help 
in acquiring work experience), and focusing on school dropouts. 
 Programs should insist on tight job search requirements, in the interests of an early exit 
from unemployment. 
Integration of services into a combined, comprehensive package seems to be more successful 
than separate provision. A good example was the relatively successful UK New Deal for Young 
People that combined a balanced system of services and sanctions, case manager support, with a 
set of other active measures. After six months unemployment the program was mandatory for 
young people aged 18 to 25 years. The participant first entered an initial “gateway” phase where 
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a PES “personal adviser” sought to place them into regular unsubsidized jobs. If the young 
person could not be placed in the job search period the adviser could then try to place them with 
a six-month employer subsidy or refer them to a mandatory training or work experience 
placement (Brewer, 2009). 
 
5. The impact and design of training and skills programs 
 
Training programs are one of the core menu of services offered by the PES in most countries and 
such programs are often targeted at older workers made redundant or “dislocated” from declining 
industries, the unskilled, mothers returning to the labor market and  unemployed young people 
who have left full-time education.
11
 Labor market (re)training programs are relatively expensive 
and although expenditure has been falling they still account for a high proportion of total 
expenditure on ALMPs, especially in European countries where they comprise over 40% of the 
total. 
Training programs are differentiated in terms of target group, content and length and will 
typically involve classroom provision and/or on-the-job training albeit online courses now also 
play an increasing role in provision. Training programs can either provide a more general 
content, such as basic skills or language courses, or computer and keyboard skills, or they may 
impart specific vocational skills. The main objective of these programs is to improve the 
employability and productivity of participants and to enhance their human capital. In some 
evaluations training also includes short courses in basic job search techniques that are designed 
to promote rapid entry into employment and where participants are required to be available for 
and seek work. 
The meta-analyses of program impacts find mixed effects from training programs. Kluve, 
for example, reports that European evaluations of “services and sanctions” and employment 
incentives were 40% to 50% more likely to report a favorable impact on employment rates than 
training programs. He found the treatment effect estimates of the training evaluations reviewed 
were often “insignificant or modestly positive” or were negative in a few cases (2006:27). There 
                                                 
11
 In many northern and western European countries, such as Denmark and the Netherlands, young people will 
generally not be paid income support between finishing school and 25 years of age unless they participate in training 
and education programs.  In other countries, such as the UK and Australia, such „education and training‟ guarantees 
are given to young people up to the age of 18. 
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were more positive results for sub groups including participants with better labor market 
prospects and women, but the results were much weaker for young people. The evaluations 
reported that most training programs had lock-in effects but any negative impact was unclear as 
participants would, by definition, have less time to seek employment and many training 
programs would have to be completed to be of subsequent value. Moreover, due to 
methodological improvements, Kluve found that several more recent evaluations that could 
follow trainee destinations over a longer time-frame, reported more positive results. De Koning 
(2007), by contrast, reported other studies that found no such improvement. 
Card et al (2009) found that job training programs, especially longer-duration programs, 
tended to have very small or negative impacts on employment measures in periods of less than a 
year, presumably reflecting lock-in effects, but the effects were more positive in the second or 
third years after participation. These findings were supported in a more recent large-scale 
matched comparison analysis of federally supported US training programs for adults in twelve 
US states. Heinrich et al (2009) found that disadvantaged adults who participated in training 
programs, typically lasting between 8 and 12 weeks, had lower earnings in the months during 
training and the year after exit, but they had caught up with the comparison group within ten 
quarters, and subsequently had much higher earnings - on average, $400 in earnings each quarter 
three years after program entry. More specific provision for “dislocated” or redundant workers 
had a smaller long term impact.  
The merits of training programs have been assessed also in the experimental US WtW 
studies. One of the more significant studies tracked the experiences of 40,000 single parent 
families participating in 11 mandatory programs over a five-year period (Hamilton, 2002). The 
study assessed which of two basic pre-employment approaches worked best and for whom. One 
approach emphasized short-term job search assistance and encouraged people to find jobs 
quickly. The other strategy emphasized longer-term skill-building activities (primarily basic 
education) before entering the labor market. A third approach mixed elements of the other two.  
Whilst each of the three strategies were found to increase single parents‟ employment and 
reduce welfare receipt, the most successful strategy was found in the mixed approach, especially 
that implemented in Portland, Oregon.  This “hybrid” increased average five-year earnings by 
25% and the average number of quarters employed by 21%, and also increased stable 
employment and earnings growth more than any of the other ten programs (Hamilton, 2002: 35).  
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In this experiment case managers were allowed to use their judgment of participants to assign 
them to different initial activities, including education and training for a significant minority.  
The key finding was that case managers made use only of work-focused short-term education 
and training courses linked to employment opportunities. 
Studies of the longer-term results from some experimental WtW programs found that the 
impacts of training became more effective over time (Dyke et al, 2006; Hotz et al, 2006). It was 
not clear, however, that these longer term gains outweighed relative costs. Greenberg et al‟s 
(2004) early article on their meta-analytical study of results from 64 programs reported that 
“work first” approaches increased earnings over six years by more than two-and-a-half times that 
achieved by training approaches. 
The reviews of US and European training program evaluations report variations in the 
impacts of different types of training. The effect of classroom training is varied but general 
classroom training seems least effective whereas when the focus has been on job-specific skills 
or on competencies demanded by employers, then classroom training can be very effective, 
particularly for women and possibly for youth (DfES & DWP, 2007; D‟Amico, 2006; Dench et 
al, 2006).  
There is much evidence from the European studies that on-the-job training has given 
consistently positive impacts for both men, women and (to a lesser extent) disadvantaged young 
people. A general finding emerging from a range of studies was that interventions with employer 
placements and work-based training were more successful in leading to employment outcomes. 
These interventions put participants in contact with employers and helped develop more general 
employability skills, as well as enabling the individuals concerned to demonstrate work 
experience to potential employers (Dench et al, 2006). European evaluations suggest also that 
training is likely to be more cost-effective when targeted at disadvantaged groups and less 
effective for groups who already have higher-level skills and qualifications. 
A wide review of US evaluations of publicly-funded training programs reported that most 
of the interventions were found effective for economically disadvantaged adult women, and 
generally found effective for economically disadvantaged adult men, although with effects that 
are generally smaller and less persistent than they are for women. On the other hand, youth 
programs had generally been unsuccessful (D‟Amicus, 2006).  
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Finally, a new body of evidence has been generated concerning the provision of 
employment retention and advancement services - which may include access to training after 
entering a job - targeted at the long-term unemployed and welfare leavers.  Yeo (2007) reviewed 
studies of WtW single parent policies in six countries that supported employment retention and 
concluded that mixed strategies were required, providing support for both the single parent and 
the employer.  The four policy instruments identified as promoting retention in work were: 
financial incentives and support; case management; development of work skills; and employer-
focused strategies.   
Elements of these retention and advancement approaches were tested in the UK and US 
and subject to high quality random assignment evaluation. In the UK the single parents assisted 
experienced an increase in earnings, largely from increasing their work hours, although this 
advantage faded as control group members caught up with them. The results for long-term older 
unemployed people, mostly men, were more positive and the gains they made in earnings and 
employment were sustained over the five year evaluation period. In the US positive impacts were 
found in only three out of twelve program sites, although the more successful elements of the 
services are now being tested in further pilot programs. These developments are now informing 
policymakers and providers as they further develop strategies and services that may help the 
long-term unemployed and welfare leavers both obtain and retain employment (Hendra et al, 
2011; 2010). 
 
5. The Public Employment Service and the impacts of implementation 
reforms  
There are variations across OECD countries in the organization and delivery of activation 
services and ALMPs. Labor Ministries play an important central role in setting labor market 
policies but implementation is often undertaken through different levels of government with PES 
organization and levels of decentralization reflecting different national patterns (see Box 4). In 
many countries responsibility for the delivery of benefits and employment services has been 
fragmented between different institutions and agencies comprising national PESs, benefits 
agencies, municipal welfare departments and social insurance bodies. These organizations are 
often accountable to different ministries, levels of government, and in some countries employer 
organizations and trade unions exercise elements of influence and control.  
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Box 4:  Types of decentralisation in employment services in European and North American 
countries  
 
Political decentralization Managerial decentralization and 
„management by objectives‟ 
within a national PES 
Federalism Regionalization Municipalization   
  all jobseekers   
Canada Belgium Denmark Austria Romania 
USA Spain Poland Finland Greece 
Switzerland  Norway Germany Hungary 
   Italy Latvia 
  Social 
assistance 
jobseekers 
France Slovenia 
 
  Finland Sweden Bulgaria 
  Germany Estonia Portugal 
  Netherlands Czech Rep. Ireland 
   UK  Slovakia 
Source: Table 1, Moseley, 2011. 
 
Comparative policy reviews and evaluation studies suggested that the design and 
organization of employment service delivery systems was one factor determining the relative 
efficiency and effectiveness of ALMPs and WtW programs, especially the transition to outcome 
measurements and the introduction of performance based management systems (OECD, 2005). 
Other drivers for reform included pressures to increase the rates at which the PES placed 
unemployed people into jobs and to modernize and improve the quality of job matching and 
benefit payment services including taking advantage of improved information and 
communication technologies. 
Service delivery reforms have been implemented differently in individual OECD 
countries but in those countries at the forefront of reform they have typically involved radical 
change in the management of PES bureaucracies and in the role of frontline officials. Many 
national governments have reduced the influence of the social partners (employer organizations 
and trade unions) and decoupled national employment services from central ministries, with 
ministers and policy makers now managing their systems through performance targets and 
agreements which specify outputs and outcomes to be achieved with the budgets allocated. 
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National PESs may also use such “management by objectives” to regulate their regional or local 
offices.  
Performance and Management Systems.  Cross-national studies of PES performance 
management and measurement systems find varying practices and, in most, the PES utilizes a 
variety of performance indicators (Mosley, 2011; Nunn et al, 2009; Grubb, 2004). At the 
simplest level managers use “input” indicators to measure the resources devoted to a particular 
service or task. “Output” indicators measure the immediate results of activity, such as the 
number of services given or interventions completed and “outcome” indicators seek to monitor 
the actual effects secured through services and interventions. Other indicators seek to assess 
service quality and this is mostly tested through satisfaction surveys undertaken with service 
users and employers. Box 5 outlines the range of different performance indicators being used by 
the different OECD employment services reviewed by Nunn et al (2009). 
Box 5: Common indicators in PES performance measurement systems 
Input 
measures 
Output 
measures 
Process 
quality 
measures 
Intermediate 
outcome 
measures 
Final outcome 
measures 
• Staff hours 
in different 
roles 
• Spending on 
staff 
• Spending on 
programs 
• Office 
numbers 
• Spending on 
compliance 
and processing 
• Vacancy 
registrations 
• Interviews 
completed 
• Referrals to 
ALMPs and other 
services 
• Caseload 
penetration 
measures 
• Individual 
action plan 
completion 
• Sanctions 
• Assessment of 
interviews or 
plans 
• Customer 
satisfaction 
surveys 
• Employer 
satisfaction 
surveys 
 
• Measures of 
people leaving 
all and specific 
cash benefits 
•  Caseload 
penetration 
measures  
• Benefit 
duration 
measures 
• Vacancy 
outcome 
measures  
• Employment rate 
• Unemployment 
rate 
• Inactivity rate 
• Productivity 
• Long-term 
wages/employment 
history of 
beneficiaries 
 
Source: Nunn et al, 2009, Table 7.1 
An increasing number of countries, including Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, 
have developed comprehensive and integrated performance measurement and reporting systems 
as part of their wider activation reforms. Such reporting systems seek to link performance 
indicators together in a way that shows the relationship between inputs and final outcomes, 
giving policy makers and senior managers greater insight into the relative performance of 
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different parts of the organization and into what appears to be working. The publication of results 
also increases accountability by showing how the PES is using its resources and meeting national 
objectives.  
Management Restructuring.  In many countries the PES and local governments now must 
work together more closely. For example, in the Netherlands, Denmark and the USA budgets 
have been devolved with municipalities and states given greater discretion within a financing 
system that rewards caseload reductions and penalizes caseload increases. There is a trend to 
integrate and coordinate the work of a range of agencies, especially the PES, welfare and social 
assistance services, into what are described as “one-stop shops”. The aim has been to improve 
accessibility and coordination by bringing together employment placement activities with benefit 
administration through the creation of a more coherent and integrated gateway to services.
12
 To 
service this evolving approach many agencies have simplified and automated the benefit claim 
process, and sought to replace frontline benefit processors with case managers or personal 
advisors. These frontline officials are expected to enforce the obligations of those receiving 
benefits and support the claimant, assist with job search, and refer them to available services.  
Greater Competition.  One further element of reform has been to subject the PES to 
greater competition. In most OECD countries PES national job placement monopolies have now 
been dismantled and there is a more or less extensive network of regulated private recruitment 
and temporary work agencies which operate in particular segments of the labor market. In an 
increasing number of countries the PES and national associations of these private sector 
intermediaries have developed formal agreements on how they should work together including 
the advertisement of any temporary vacancies and the management of PES referrals (see, for 
example, Eurociett, 2008). 
There has also been significant change in the ways in which ministries, the PES or other 
public entities contract with external providers to deliver ALMPs and other employment 
services, with Australia in particular creating a new market where a network of for-profit and 
non-profit organizations deliver all publicly funded employment services.  
                                                 
12
 These developments have different patterns where implementing organizations are not merely subordinate units of 
a national administration but relatively independent regional or local political entities with their own elected 
leadership. In such complex and multilevel governance structures the relationship between central and regional or 
local authorities is less hierarchical and service delivery developments must be negotiated, often through different 
partnership frameworks. 
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It is hard to disentangle the particular impacts of PES delivery and implementation 
reforms from those of the activation and WtW programs that they have delivered (Riley et al, 
2007).
13
 Nevertheless there is a growing body of evidence that investigates the impacts of two 
important implementation reforms. These evaluations concern the work of front line advisers and 
the PES subcontractors who deliver services through performance based and payment-by-results 
contracts. 
 
5.1 The impact of case managers and personal advisers 
The term “case management” is generally recognised as deriving from practices in social work 
and health care provision which first emerged in the USA. Recognition of the problems service 
users faced in dealing with multiple, specialized programs led, in the 1970s, to a series of federal 
and state level demonstration projects to assess the possibilities of service integration and 
coordinated community support. These involved the establishment of core support agencies and 
one-stop service centres, within which individual staff members, or case managers, were 
allocated responsibility for coordinating resources on behalf of their clients and were accountable 
for clients‟ passage through the service system.  
Since the 1970s, the “case management” approach has become a leading paradigm for 
service delivery, spreading to other OECD countries, and in the 1990s it was being adopted in 
welfare to work and employment services reforms.  
There is much variation in the resources and status of the case managers employed in 
employment service delivery systems, ranging from the ways in which they are employed, their 
job titles, the autonomy they have; and in their caseloads and the frequency and nature of contact 
that they have with unemployed people.
14
 Despite these differences case managers have a dual 
role in assisting clients with job search whilst communicating and enforcing the requirements the 
client must meet to remain eligible for benefit. The task involves some core generic functions. 
These include undertaking an assessment of a client‟s circumstances and employment 
                                                 
13
 There are studies that explore some impacts of large scale PES organizational reforms. In the UK the National 
Audit Office (2008) reported that the creation of Jobcentre Plus, which merged the work of the PES with benefits 
administration, was cost effective and underpinned the effective delivery of a wide range of employment policies. A 
large-scale evaluation of the German Hartz reforms found that delivery of employment services through agencies 
that integrated the work of the PES and municipalities was more efficient and cost-effective than in localities where 
the municipality was solely responsible for delivery (FMLSA, 2009).  
14
 In the UK, for example, they are referred to as “personal advisers”; in Holland they are “reintegration coaches”; 
and in Australia they are called “recruitment consultants”. 
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constraints; planning the range of support or assistance needed; linking the client with necessary 
external services; monitoring a client's progress through an agreed series of steps or supply of a 
set of services; and the achievement of an employment outcome.  
Impact evaluation studies have sought to identify the particular effects of different case 
management styles in improving employment outcomes and which frontline practices have 
contributed to their effectiveness.   
Experimental WtW evaluations in the US investigated the differential impacts of 
traditional case management (where benefit administration and employment assistance were 
given separately) and integrated case management (where both functions were brought together) 
(Scrivener et al, 2001). The results found that integrated case managers provided more 
personalized attention, engaged more people in WtW activities, and more closely monitored 
participation in program activities. Both approaches reduced welfare receipt and payments, but 
the effects of the integrated program were somewhat larger. In a subsequent analysis, 
summarizing findings from experimental studies on service strategies in 59 different 
employment offices across the USA, researchers reported higher employment and earnings 
impacts in those offices where case managers delivered a personalized service and placed an 
emphasis on quick job entry. There was some evidence also that high caseloads reduced 
effectiveness (Bloom et al, 2003). Another US experimental study found that clients‟ average 
earnings were higher over a two-year period in offices that primarily used both unified case 
management and that employed a specialist who developed job opportunities (Hill, 2005).  
Later European evaluations contain similar findings. In the UK, for example, the positive 
impacts associated with many New Deal employment programs have been attributed in particular 
to the contribution made by personal advisers especially in those PES offices where the advisers 
placed a strong emphasis on “work first” practices including closely-spaced repeat interviewing 
of jobseekers and use of sanctions to enforce the mandatory nature of the program (Hasluck and 
Green, 2007; NAO, 2006). A quasi-experimental study in Switzerland found that caseworkers 
who put greater emphasis on job search obligations secured higher employment outcomes than 
those who placed more stress on meeting the expressed needs of the unemployed (Behncke et al, 
2007). A Swedish study found that PES caseworkers who focus on job search assistance rather 
than referral to other services, such as training, increased the probability of being employed 
within a year by 13% (Lagerström, 2011). A Danish study found also that job search assistance 
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and frequent caseworker meetings were highly cost effective in shortening unemployment spells 
(Vikstrom et al, 2011). 
 
5.2 The impact of subcontracting employment services 
In many OECD countries government departments and public agencies have a long tradition of 
delivering employment services through grants or contracts with other public and non-profit 
organisations. Such networks often include various types of training institutions, which may have 
links with the social partners; providers of specialist services and facilities, for example, in 
vocational rehabilitation or sheltered employment; and large non-profit organisations that deliver 
a wide range of social and employment-related services. More recently there has been an 
increase in the delivery of employment services by for-profit organizations.
15
 
In individual OECD countries the commissioning and contracting of employment 
services is typically complex and, in many countries, small scale, with a wide variety of 
procurement practices (OECD, 2007). Subcontracted activities typically include the delivery of 
conventional labor market programs and more intensive forms of support targeted at 
disadvantaged groups, including specialist programs for those with disabilities. Australia is the 
only OECD country to wholly outsource the delivery of publicly funded employment services. 
There are variations in the level of government and composition of the public agencies 
that procure employment services, with skills training often funded and purchased separately. 
Purchasers range from national government departments, as in the UK and Australia, which 
apply a centralised contracting framework, through to decentralised and multi-purchaser systems, 
as in the USA, Denmark and Germany. In many countries, especially within Europe, local and 
regional offices of the PES often purchase services but typically within a national framework of 
guidelines, contracts and predetermined services (OECD, 2007).  
Whilst systematic information is unavailable it appears that in many OECD countries 
purchasers procure specific services, typically specifying the detailed design of the particular 
employment intervention or training course to be delivered. The public body also determines the 
price to be paid and the terms of the contract. Contracts often are short-term with durations of 
                                                 
15
 These for-profits include private employment agencies, such as Manpower, Randstad and Adecco, alongside a 
range of other companies that specialise in delivering employment services. This includes organizations now 
operating in several countries, such as A4e and Working Links from the UK, Calder from the Netherlands, Ingeus 
from Australia, and Maximus and Rescare from the USA. 
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one year or less. Payment systems also vary from recurrent public funding, to grants, to staged 
payments or fees paid for services delivered.  
Payments for placing people into employment have been used less extensively. One 
reason is that in many countries subcontracted providers are not expected to, or may be 
prohibited from, assisting participants in their programs with actual job placement (as was the 
case until recently in Spain). In several countries there is resistance to contracting out services 
with for-profit providers and regulatory barriers exist preventing such entities from competing 
for contracts. 
The increased involvement of private for-profit organisations in delivering employment 
services correlates to changes in subcontracting systems. In a number of countries procurement is 
now characterised by competitive tendering, the selection of employment service providers on 
the basis of price and quality, and the payment of providers based on their performance in 
delivering services and securing employment outcomes.  
Performance-based contracting; including elements of payment for employment 
outcomes, was first developed in the USA and subsequently extended to the UK, Australia and 
the Netherlands. Other countries have more recently implemented or are testing changes in their 
employment services contracts with several, such as Germany, France, Denmark, Sweden, and 
Israel, experimenting with job outcome performance contracts and delivery through for-profit 
providers (Kaps, 2010; Behaghely et al, 2011; Bredgaard, 2010;  Bennmarker et al, 2009; 
OECD, 2010b).  
There is now an expanding evidence base on the impacts of these subcontracting changes. 
A recent evidence review (Finn, 2011) identified twelve European experimental or quasi-
experimental studies that compared and contrasted the performance of the PES and 
subcontracted providers. There are also several impact studies of outsourced employment 
services undertaken by the responsible Australian federal department.
16
 
The European impact evaluations show mixed results for delivery by private providers 
with the most positive results in four British studies and mixed or negative results from studies in 
Germany, France and Sweden.  
                                                 
16
 The review identified only two impact studies of subcontracting in the USA, both of which were undertaken in 
Florida, although several important studies of welfare to work subcontracting give valuable insight into the design 
and delivery of such systems (Bryna Sanger, 2003; McConnell et al, 2003). 
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Three of the British studies, for example, compared the positive results of Employment 
Zones (EZs, see Box 6 for explanation) and New Deal programs finding that both had net 
impacts on the destination of long-term unemployed participants but that the EZs appeared to be 
more effective. One study found that a year after eligibility, 34% of EZ participants had 
experienced a spell of work at some time, compared to 24% in the comparison group (Hales et 
al, 2003). Another study found that 8% more 25 to 50 year old EZ participants started jobs, and 
10% more retained those jobs at 13 weeks, than in comparable New Deal areas (Griffiths and 
Durkin, 2007). 
By contrast the German studies found that for the short-term unemployed private 
providers had a negative impact on employment outcomes (2.3% to 2.6%) and the probability of 
unemployment was 7% higher, whilst there were varied effects for the long term unemployed 
with positive impacts on some hard to help groups but adverse effects on those with more recent 
work experience (Winterhager, 2006; Bernhard and Wolff, 2008). A large scale French 
experimental study found that while more intensive support from PES and private providers 
increased participants‟ exit rates to employment by 4 to 9 percentage points, the impact of the 
PES program was “about twice as large” as those of the private providers (Behaghely et al, 
2011:14; see Box 7). In Sweden the results from an experimental study found that private 
providers secured better outcomes, and higher wages after twelve months, for immigrant 
participants, but they had worse results on both indicators than the PES for younger participants 
(Bennmarker et al, 2009). 
 
Box 6: Evaluations of Private Provision: UK Employment Zones and the New Deal 25 Plus 
The Employment Zones (EZs) were established in 15 areas of high unemployment in 2000 and 
operated until 2011. They were delivered by seven contracted providers, nearly all of which 
were for-profits businesses. Providers were paid a fee for completing an action plan with each 
adult long term unemployed participant but most of their income depended on getting people 
into employment that was sustained for at least 13 weeks.  
 
The ND25+ was the program for long term unemployed people in the rest of the country. It 
involved support from a PES personal adviser who tried to place a participant in an initial 
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gateway period that could last 16 weeks, including a period of compulsory full time job search 
activity.  This was followed by an “Intensive Activity Period” for up to 13 weeks, where the 
adviser would refer the participant to a short program that could comprise work 
experience/placements, work focused training and/or help with motivation and soft skills. This 
provision was delivered by subcontractors who were largely paid through service fees. 
 
The EZs were not designed to provide a direct comparison between state and private delivery of 
employment services, as the New Deal was also in part delivered by contractors. The EZs were 
instead used to test and assess whether contractors could deliver better outcomes when they 
have more flexibility to design their own interventions rather than following the more 
prescriptive sequence of employment assistance available in the standard New Deals.  
 
The positive results from the EZs informed the design of the much larger scale, and recently 
introduced British Work Program, where a small number of subcontracted prime providers are 
being paid almost wholly on the basis of placing people in jobs and sustaining them in 
employment for up to two years. See http://www.dwp.gov.uk/supplying-dwp/what-we-
buy/welfare-to-work-services/work-program/ 
 
Box 7: Comparing the results of the French Public Employment Service vs. subcontractors 
In 2007 Unedic, the then French social insurance agency, commissioned external contractors to 
work with 41,000 jobseekers eligible for at least a year of unemployment benefits. Eleven 
private companies were selected to deliver intensive job search support in 16 areas and 
jobseekers were allocated to them for up to six months. The payment structure comprised 30% 
of the maximum payment paid when the jobseeker enrolled on the programme; 35% paid if the 
jobseeker found  a job within six months and the remaining 35% paid after six months 
employment. The maximum possible payment varied in each area, between €3,000 and €3,947. 
The French PES (then ANPE) responded to this competitive pressure and launched its own in-
house intensive programme in 2007 for 40,000 participants.  
The agencies agreed on an experimental random assignment evaluation which covered 393 local 
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PES offices, involving more than 200,000 job seekers. Jobseekers were free to refuse 
participation in either of the intensive options. 
 
The evaluation compared the performance of the private providers with both an enhanced 
service offered by ANPE and the less intensive service the PES normally provided. The 
evaluation found that both variants of intensive services “used the same method and basic 
ingredients” involving, for example, at least weekly contact, monthly face-to-face meetings and 
caseload ratios of about 40 to 1, compared to the 120 to 1 in mainstream PES provision 
(Behaghely et al, 2011: 6).  
 
 The evaluation found that both private and public variants of more intensive job search 
provision increased the participants‟ exit rates to employment by 4 to 9 percentage points, a 
15% to 35% increase against exit rates of about 25% from conventional PES delivery. The 
effects were pervasive across sub-populations but tended to be “stronger among job seekers with 
a higher probability of long-term unemployment” (Behaghely et al, 2011: 3). The study also 
found that the impact of the PES higher intensity programme was “about twice as large” as 
those of the private providers with the gap being “statistically significant‟ for up to six months 
after random assignment. In the areas where the two intensive programmes were in direct 
competition, the PES impact was 11 points after 3 months with the private provider starting to 
catch up after six months. The evaluation found that the impact of both PES and private 
providers was weaker in areas where they operated singly suggesting that direct competition 
improved performance (Behaghely et al, 2011: 14). 
 
It is difficult to draw firm conclusions from these disparate findings. Each of the studies 
used varying methodologies, with relative strengths and weaknesses. Each study also focused on 
the results from specific subcontracting systems in a particular period in individual countries. 
Voluntary and differential participation in subcontracted services limited the validity of findings 
from the random assignment experiments. Most of the studies were undertaken also in the early 
phases of the development and implementation of subcontracting reforms and they highlight 
faults in the design of contract incentives and procurement processes. In the respective countries 
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studied the subcontracting systems have since been changed with significant design reforms, 
many made in response to the evidence emerging from these and other evaluations.  
One particular issue is that the European studies largely compared one general form of 
PES provision against all private providers and they gave little information on the characteristics 
and performance variation between different private providers. One of the advantages of 
subcontracting is, however, the ability over time to select better performing providers with less 
effective providers losing contracts or leaving the market.  
Indeed, the findings from Australian research suggest efficiency gains and cost reductions 
from subcontracting take time to emerge. One Australian study reported that the net impact of 
contracted out intensive assistance targeted at the long-term unemployed and most disadvantaged 
had increased from 0.6% in 2001, to 6.2% in 2002, to 10.1% in 2005 (DEWR, 2006: 4). 
Australian officials emphasize also that the raw cost-per-employment outcome for PES delivery 
was around A$8,000 in 1994, and fell to about A$6,500 in the first wave of subcontracted 
delivery, and then to A$3,500 by 2005 (Carters 2010: slide 26). The improved impacts were 
achieved only as the federal department developed its knowledge of the performance capacity of 
different private providers, excluded poor performers, and improved its ability to steer the 
program through competition and more effective performance management (Finn, 2011). 
The findings from the impact evaluations and other studies reviewed show mixed results 
from subcontracted employment services provision. The key insight is, however, that both non-
profit and for-profit providers can, under well designed contractual arrangements, improve 
outcomes for particular groups and bring innovation to service delivery. The competitive 
pressure they bring may also prompt improved PES performance (see Box 7).  
 
6.  The role of ALMPs in the economic downturn 
Latin America and the Caribbean is a region with a long history of swings in unemployment and 
underemployment in response to economic crisis.  While recent evidence demonstrated that most 
of Latin America and the Caribbean recovered relatively quickly from the most recent financial 
crisis, short-term employment related effects were particularly pronounced in Mexico and 
Central American markets closest to the United States (Mazza, 2011).   Recent OECD evidence 
indicates that redesigned ALMPs, as described in earlier sections, aided adjustment to economic 
downturns.  There is evidence that prior to the recession the employment rate increased and 
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unemployment fell quicker in those OECD countries that had redesigned their ALMPs within a 
comprehensive activation strategy (EC, 2006; OECD, 2005). There is some evidence also that so 
far such countries have been better placed to adjust to the shocks generated by the „global 
financial crisis‟ and have experienced lower levels of unemployment than might otherwise have 
occurred (OECD, 2011).  
Another significant development is that OECD countries which introduced pre-crisis 
reforms in benefit and activation systems seem to have been administratively “better prepared to 
cope with the rapid increase in unemployment” (OECD, 2011: 282).  Earlier reforms aimed at 
“broadening coverage, tightening eligibility, increasing conditionality and making work pay” 
increased the effectiveness of the emergency measures taken to deal with the shocks of the 
“global financial crisis”. 
 
7. Policy Conclusions and Perspectives for Latin American and Caribbean 
Countries  
Public policy choices are shaped by a wide range of political, economic and institutional factors 
but a trend in OECD countries has been the extent to which activation and ALMP reforms have 
been influenced by findings from evaluation studies.  Indeed, the European Commission and 
OECD have promoted the development of evidence-informed policy making, encouraging 
national ministries and PESs both to monitor program outcomes, sponsor research and 
evaluations and to learn from the findings available from other countries and from comparative 
reviews. 
In many of the counties that have been in the forefront of these reforms, such as 
Germany, New Zealand and the UK, performance monitoring and evaluation research have been 
embedded in their implementation strategies. In each of the countries‟ governments have drawn 
on evidence of “best practice” to design and redesign job search requirements, employment 
programs and earnings supplements. Over time program design has been tested and modified in 
the light of findings from impact and process evaluations with many innovations, especially in 
the UK, being piloted and tested prior to fuller implementation (findings from ALMP evaluations 
undertaken in each of these three countries are synthesized in Brewer, 2008; Caliendo, 2009; 
Jacobi and Kluve, 2007; Johri et al, 2004). 
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Recent OECD evidence reviews uphold an emerging consensus that “services and 
sanctions” – employment services in developing country contexts – including support from case 
managers with job search and matching, have the most positive impact on subsequent 
employment rates. By contrast both direct job creation schemes and classroom based skills 
training programs perform rather badly, unless they are small in scale and targeted, and/or unless 
they are strongly “employer‐oriented” and linked to practical job experience in a real 
employment environment. Estimated impacts quite often differ between men and women and 
between young people and the adult unemployed. Whilst the estimated net impacts often appear 
small they are, especially in the context of guaranteed minimum income systems, likely to have 
significant cumulative economic and budgetary effects. 
The evaluation evidence suggests also that ALMPs are more effective when integrated in 
a combined approach where job search support is supplemented by selective referrals to training 
or other longer term programs only for those found to be most likely to benefit from 
participation. This is now a characteristic of the approaches targeted at unemployed young 
people in many OECD countries.   This should be of particular interest to Latin American and 
Caribbean nations which are designing referral and training services as part of advancing the 
development of their public employment services. 
The findings from the OECD evidence reviews provide useful policy insights but it is 
important to stress that the policies and the findings on relative ALMP effectiveness have been 
shaped within distinctive labor markets, governance arrangements and social security systems. 
Much of the recent OECD evidence was also generated in national contexts until recently 
characterized by jobs growth and falling unemployment. The concerns about, and relative 
findings on, the “lock-in” effects of training and temporary employment programs, for example, 
may mean such investments have higher value in a period of sustained higher unemployment 
(Forslund et al, 2011). 
There are other reasons to be cautious when seeking to learn from the evidence derived 
from OECD experience. While there have been few impact evaluations of ALMPs in developing 
countries the findings suggest that the effects of different types of programs may differ from the 
effects found in OECD countries. Betcherman et al (2007, 2004) report findings which suggest 
that the evaluated training programs for youth seem to have had a more positive impact in 
developing countries and evaluations of public works programs had been more favorable in 
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transition countries than in developed countries. Findings from high quality evaluations of youth 
training programs in Latin America highlight also the heterogeneity of impacts in different 
countries with variable effects for different groups of participants but with significantly higher 
employment effects for women in Colombia and Panama (Ibarrarán and Rosas Shady, 2009). 
Such differential impacts may be attributable to a number of factors ranging from institutional 
capacity to higher levels of informality or the greater proportion of disadvantaged populations 
and such factors must be taken into account when seeking to adapt best practices from OECD 
countries.  
Despite the differences in institutional capacity, labor market contexts and welfare 
arrangements, there are worthwhile lessons for Latin American and Caribbean countries as they 
consider the future configuration of their “cash transfer”, public training and labor intermediation 
services.  
Some lessons concern avoiding earlier OECD mistakes, for example, in allowing cash 
transfer systems or other forms of income supports to become passive, especially for the long- 
term unemployed, or to encourage transitions into retirement or disability benefits as a way of 
reducing unemployment. This would be particularly important for Latin American and Caribbean 
countries considering the implementation of unemployment insurance schemes that also need to 
consider the development of employment services able to effectively monitor and support job 
search.  The experience in most OECD countries from responses to earlier recessions was that 
inadvertently encouraging disconnection from work became entrenched and it has taken many 
years to reverse such policy choices and create more employment-focused benefit systems. More 
positive lessons concern ways in which varying social protection and social assistance or cash 
transfer systems may be developed and implemented to encourage and require people who are 
capable of work to seek and take jobs. 
The purpose of “activating” benefit systems is to have workless people engage in 
employment-focused activities in a new way. This is likely to be effective only if the users of the 
system perceive increased opportunities in the new regime. This involves a combination of 
services that help reduce employment barriers, incentives that “make work pay” and work-
related requirements and sanctions.  
The first phase of activation reform involved modernization of benefit rules for the 
unemployed to require “active” job search, to ensure they took advantage of available labor 
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market opportunities, and to require the longer term unemployed to participate in employment 
assistance programs. In several countries the actual name of the cash payment was changed from 
“unemployment benefit” to, for example, the British “Jobseekers Allowance”, to reinforce the 
point that eligibility was designed to support and was conditional on active job search. In many 
OECD countries cash supports targeted at disadvantaged young people are paid only if they 
engage in education and/or work based training (echoing the design of Latin American 
“conditional cash transfers” for younger children). 
Change has also been made in the organization, training and management of frontline 
staff, who may previously have administered benefits and bureaucratic reporting processes or 
been social workers. A significant innovation has concerned changing such staff into 
employment-focused frontline case workers or personal advisers and ensuring that the scarce 
resource of face-to-face contact time is targeted most at clients who have significant employment 
barriers where advisers can help with job search, broker access to job vacancies and services and 
enforce obligations. In OECD countries public agencies are increasingly encouraging more 
employable clients to use self-service channels to undertake their own job search whilst investing 
in a more personalized service targeted at the most disadvantaged groups. A key tool for advisers 
has been the development and use of individualized job seeking or reintegration agreements, 
signed by service users, which spell out responsibilities and rights and the agreed steps to be 
taken. 
Evidence on the most effective combination of work-related requirements and services is 
mixed. In OECD countries different approaches and sequences of support are needed for the 
diverse groups subject to activation requirements, from early school-leavers or high school 
dropouts and the young and long term unemployed through to single parents and those with 
health issues. The cumulative evidence points to the effectiveness of a strong employment-
focused “message” delivered through well-trained case workers or advisers, with the flexibility 
to tailor employment assistance and support services to meet the needs of individual service 
users. Engagement with such services may be secured through clear communication of 
requirements reinforced by varying sanctions.  
Finally, institutional reforms have also been a critical component of change in OECD 
countries. Such reforms have included the introduction of performance based management and 
contracting systems alongside the development of “one stop” entry points to the PES. Key 
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factors have included requirements that the PES engage with harder-to-place groups, that there 
are effective referral arrangements with other agencies such as training providers and that in 
localities the PES and other local agencies develop more integrated services through partnership 
agreements.  
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Annex A: Effects of US Welfare-to-Work reforms 
Outcome Findings 
Caseload (1) Most studies show that both pre-1996 and post-1996 reforms contributed to 
caseload decline, although the improved economy also contributed a significant 
effect. 
(2) A large fraction, if not the majority, of the effect arose from decreased entry 
to the program rather than increased exit. 
(3) Those leaving welfare did so partly because of sanctions; those sanctioned 
were sometimes the more disadvantaged families rather than the more 
advantaged. 
(4) Those leaving welfare often lost access to other benefits and services. 
Employment (1) Most studies show positive net effects on employment rates. 
(2) Women who left welfare had employment rates of approximately 60% to 
70%. 
(3) Employment rates of women on welfare rose from under 10% to over 30%. 
(4) Those who were not employed often had income from others in the family 
or from other transfer programs. 
(5) A high fraction worked full time as well as part time. 
Earnings (1) Most studies show positive, if small, net effect on earnings. 
(2) There were increased earnings from other household members in the 
families of women who left welfare.  
(3) Hourly wage rates were above the official minimum wage. 
(4) Variable evidence on whether wages grow with experience after leaving 
welfare. 
Family 
income and 
poverty 
(1) Most studies show increases in average family income and declines in 
poverty rates. 
(2) Women who left welfare had, on average, only small increases in income 
and declines in poverty.  Those women who did not enter welfare experienced 
strong increases in income and declines in poverty. 
(3) The incomes of women who left welfare increased marginally because the 
loss of benefits almost cancelled out the increase in earnings and increase in 
other household members‟ income. 
(4) Some early studies showed a decline in income and increase in poverty 
among very low income single mother families; this effect was not found to 
show up in their consumption patterns. 
Source: Moffitt R.  (2008) Welfare reform: the U.S. experience, Discussion Paper No. 1334 08, Institute for 
Research on Poverty, Madison, Wisconsin. Adapted from Table 4: 26.   
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